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production and on the regulations imposed to limit these consequences. This study examines the effect that
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Abstract 
The U.S. hog industry is experiencing an increase m both the average stze and 
geographical concentration of feeding operations. These increases have caused attention 
to focus on the environmental consequences of hog production and on the regulations 
imposed to limit these consequences. This study examines the effect that differences in 
state water quality regulations have on the location of hog production in the U.S. Farm 
size is an important characteristic and therefore this analysis is conducted separately on 
small and large farms in order to examine the differences in effects by size of operation. 
Results suggest greater water quality regulatory stringency has no effect on the location 
of hog production. The amount of production on small feeding operations seems 
responsive to traditional input and transportation costs, while production on larger 
operations is seemingly dependent on the existence of transportation and agricultural 
infrastructure. 
Key words: hog industry, environmental regulation, location of production 
Location of Production and Endogenous 
\Vater Quality Regulation: 
A Look at the U.S. Hog Industry 
Introduction 
The level of regulation concerning the control of nonpoint source (NPS) pollution 
released from animal feeding operations (AFOs) differs from state to state in the 
U.S. Many states with large animal feeding industries are facing increased environ-
mental pressures and are therefore moving towards increasing the stringency of their 
environmental regulations. These increases in regulation will be accompanied by cor-
responding increases in the waste management costs for AFOs as increased stringency 
forces producers to incur new environmental compliance costs. How important is this 
increase in compliance costs to the competitiveness of AFOs? Is it important enough 
to cause feeding operations to relocate in areas with relatively low levels of environ-
mental regulations? This study attempts to answer this question empirically, and 
specifically determine if stringent environmental water quality regulations have an 
effect on the location of hog feeding operations in the U.S. 
Production may locate in states with low regulation and correspondingly, regula-
tion may increase in states with increased production. This endogeneity is captured 
in this analysis through the two-stage estimation of state hog inventory levels and 
state regulatory stringency. The environment is treated as an input in the produc-
tion process and four different proxies are used in this study to quantify the cost of 
utilizing this input, which is in effect the level of state regulatory stringency in a state. 
A major contribution of this paper is the construction of a qualitative stringency in-
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dex from the examination of 27 states' legislation concerning regulations imposed on 
AFOs to protect state water quality. 
Results from this study find evidence for the following: 
1. Increased stringency of water quality regulation has no significant detrimental 
effect on the location of hog production in the U.S. 
2. The most important factors influencing production on small hog operations 
seem to be output price, feed input price, and the cost of transportation. 
3. Production decisions for large hog operations seem to be driven primarily by 
the states' level of existing agricultural infrastructure to facilitate transportation 
and the slaughter of hogs. 
The results of this study tend to agree with previous studies on the manufacturing 
sector, which have found no significant negative effects on production from increases in 
the stringency of environmental regulation (Bartik 1988, McConnell and Schwab 1990, 
Levinson 1996, Mani, Parga!, and Hug 1997). This result suggests that despite the 
appearance that hog production is intensifying and relocating outside the traditional 
hog producing areas in to take advantage of lower environmental standards, in fact, 
other state characteristics are driving this movement of production. 
The next section of the paper will provide a brief background on the nexus between 
the environmental impacts and the current dynamics of hog production location in the 
U.S. and will also give a brief review of Federal and state legislation. The model will 
then be presented, followed by a description of the data and the results of empirical 
analysis. 
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Background 
The transition towards specialization and vertical coordination in the hog produc-
tion industry has led to conditions that favor increases in the size and geographic 
concentration of hog farms. Increases in the size of hog farming operations have 
been dramatic in recent years as the number of farms with more than 2,000 head, 
which had accounted for 28 percent of U.S. inventory in December, 1993, had risen 
to 63.5 percent as of December, 1998. Approximately 40 percent of this growth in 
large farms has occurred in the State of North Carolina, and this type of increased 
geographical concentration is becoming characteristic of the industry (Martin and 
Zering 1997, Hubbell 1997). 
A consequence of the increasing geographical concentration of hog production is a 
heightening of the burden placed on the environment. A 1998 survey of agricultural 
states discovered that most of these states identify hog AFOs as a controversial envi-
ronmental issue. Fifteen of the 24 states surveyed have implemented legislation within 
the last year to limit AFO pollution, and 16 states currently have new legislation pro-
posed. In addition, all states except one indicated increased public media attention on 
hog farms and increased legal action against hog operations (NACPTF 1998). This 
increase in regulatory and public attention directed towards hog feeding operations 
makes examination of the compliance costs of waste regulation an important policy 
issue (Innes 1999). 
Theoretically, there is no doubt that increased costs imposed exclusively on a 
single firm will decrease the competitiveness of that firm in an industry. It may be, 
however, that this theoretical effect is so small as to render it insignificant for policy 
considerations. Other characteristics of the state, both economic and geographical, 
may be more important in influencing a producer's location decision. Therefore, this 
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study is an empirical investigation to determine if the potentially detrimental effect 
of increased environmental regulation is significant in determining the location of 
production in the U.S. hog industry. 
A relevant body of literature has developed examining the effects of changes m 
environmental regulations on the location decisions of manufacturing industries (Jaffe, 
Peterson, Portney, and Stavins 1995). There is no general consensus on the relative 
importance of this effect at the state and local level. Some studies have found evidence 
that increased regulation can significantly influence industry location (Bartik 1989, 
Duffy-Deno 1992, Henderson 1996), while other studies find little significant evidence 
of such an effect or that the effect occurs only in cases were regulation is extremely 
severe (Bartik 1988, McConnell and Schwab 1990, Levinson 1996, Mani, Pargal, and 
Hug 1997). Three studies that look at the effect of environmental regulation on 
agricultural operations discover that a higher stringency of regulation does have a 
significant effect on the location of dairy farm operations ( Osei and Lakshminarayan 
1996, Outlaw 1993) and in the aquaculture industry (Wirth and Luzar 1998). An 
earlier study on the hog industry examining changes in production from 1988-1995 
found mixed results (Mo and Abdalla 1997). 
Regulation 
The environmental implications of hog production include the detrimental effects 
imposed on water, soil, and air quality by the animal waste introduced into the envi-
ronment during the production process. Most states do not allow any waste discharge 
directly into state waterways; therefore, a common waste management practice is to 
use effluent from hog waste management to supplement commercial fertilizer on field 
crops. Excess waste application to croplands leads to leaching, and this type of pol-
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lution is called nonpoint source pollution as it is not released into the environment 
at a single controllable point but rather is introduced into the water, soil, and air 
over a diffuse area. It is estimated that nonpoint source waste from livestock pro-
duction may account for up to 20 percent of the surface water pollution in the U.S. 
(Long 1992). Studies have also revealed that feedlots are a more important source of 
water pollution in rivers than are storm sewers or industrial sources (U.S. EPA 1993). 
Facts such as these have helped focus attention on water quality regulatory issues 
concerning the NPS pollution released by hog farms. 
Water quality has been an important regulatory concern in the United States since 
the inception of the 1972 Federal Clean Water Act. This legislation placed primary 
responsibility for implementation of water quality programs and for the enforcement 
of the regulation of nonpoint sources on state and local governments (U.S. EPA 1995). 
NPS pollution was regulated more stringently at the Federal level in the 1987 Water 
Quality Act as concerns grew that state regulation alone was not providing sufficient 
protection for water quality (Ribaudo and Woo 1991, U.S. EPA 1995, Jones and 
Sutton 1996) 
Federal involvement increased further through the 1990 USDA Water Quality 
Program and subsequent 1996 Environmental Quality Incentives Program, which for-
malized a commitment to protect water quality from agricultural pollution (USDA-
ERS 1997). Recent joint action in 1998 by the EPA and USDA has proposed the 
need for a uniform national strategy implementing Federal standards for nutrient 
management (USDA 1998). Although Federal regulation of NPS water pollution has 
been steadily increasing since 1972, the majority of the regulatory and enforcement 
responsibilities still resides at the state level. 
This history of the Federal regulatory framework empowering state agencies to 
set policy has allowed for variability in the extent of regulation imposed across states 
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(:0,letcalfe 1999). Waste management plans are required in 23 of the 27 states exam-
ined in this study. Among those states requiring plans, Connecticut, Illinois, Iowa, 
and ~linnesota are the most restrictive and require specification of nutrient plans, ad-
herence to best management practices, and implementation of a detailed description 
of the waste management system. 
Nutrient standards are set for field application of manure in 22 states. Nitrogen 
standards for crops are required in Arkansas, Kentucky, Maryland, and Ohio and 
phosphorous standards are used in Michigan. Nutrient standards as well as set-back 
distances are implemented in Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, and Mississippi to better control 
field application of nutrients. 
Some type of groundwater monitoring around AFOs is undertaken in 16 states. 
Colorado, Iowa, Kansas, Nebraska, and Oregon can require farms to monitor ground-
water quality if the particular situation is considered a risk for contamination. Larger 
AFOs are required to monitor wells in Georgia, Maryland, Oklahoma, and Vermont. 
Do differences such as these in state regulation affect compliance costs and influ-
ence the concentrated location of hog production? The next section introduces the 
methodology used to examine this question and then the empirical model and the 
results are provided. 
Model 
A model of profit maximization for hog producers is utilized to obtain a functional 
relationship for hog inventory in a state. The supply and demand for the environ-
mental input is also developed in order to obtain a functional relationship describing 
the shadow price of utilizing the environment in production. This shadow price is 
treated as the environmental input price and represents the level of stringency in state 
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regulations. A two-stage estimation of inventory and the environmental input price 
allows the effect of state regulatory stringency on state inventory to be examined 
while accounting for the inherent endogeneity of these variables. 
Assuming perfect competition and rational agents, hog farms locate in the state 
where expected profits are the highest. This model does not explain the decision 
process concerning how to change production, but rather it assumes that a change is 
determined necessary and the decision is in which state to change production. The 
production of hogs is a function of the inputs; feed, labor, land, and the environ-
ment. The environment is included in this model as an input into the production 
process as hog farms incur a cost to utilize the environment to dispose of hog waste. 
Specifically, this study will be concerned with the environmental cost of utilizing state 
water quality. This cost of using water quality is a function of the level of a state's 
environmental regulation and will be captured in the model through the input price 
of the environment. The production technology is represented by: 
(1) 
where z0 is the quantity of hog output, z1 is the quantity of corn feed, z2 is the 
quantity of labor, z3 is the quantity of land, and z4 is the quantity of environmental 
input. 
Costs in this model include the unit costs of the inputs, which are represented as 
Pi; i = 1, 2, 3, 4, as well as the costs incurred transporting these inputs to the farm and 
the cost of transporting the finished hogs to slaughter. These transportation costs are 
represented as ti, which represents the per-unit cost of transporting good i. 1 When 
an AFO chooses a state it is also choosing the prices it will face for its output and 
inputs as well as the per unit transportation costs that will be incurred. Therefore 
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the firm's optimization problem in each state can be represented as follows: 
4 
max 1r = [po- ta]F(z) - l:[pi + ti]zi 
z 
(2) 
i=l 
Optimization of the profit function provides the usual first order conditions equat-
ing the marginal benefits and marginal costs of utilizing inputs. Solving this system 
of first order conditions provides the derived demand equations for the inputs. These 
derived demands are functions of the output price for hogs and all the per-unit costs 
in the model. Utilizing these derived demand relationships, we can obtain the opti-
mal supply of hogs as a function of output price, all input prices, and transportation 
costs: 
(3) 
where z~ represents the optimum supply of hogs. 
Given the inherent endogeneity between hog inventory and the level of regulation 
in a state, estimation of this functional relationship directly would be inefficient and 
therefore an instrument is developed and used in place of the endogenous price of 
the environmental input. A functional relationship for p4 is obtained through devel-
opment of a supply and demand model for the environmental input. The predicted 
values from the estimation of this relationship are then used as the instrument for 
p4 in equation (3). This instrument is appropriate as it is correlated with p4 but is 
obtained through estimation on variables exogenous to hog supply and therefore is 
itself exogenous to supply. 
Using the derived demand equation for the environmental input from the prof-
it maximization, the following demand relationship for the environmental input is 
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obtained: 
(4) 
A supply relationship for the environmental input can be obtained by accounting 
for the social damage caused by the use of the environmental input. This social 
damage is a function of the quantity of environmental input used in hog production 
as well as characteristics of the state that would determine environmental attitudes 
and preferences. 2 
(5) 
The variable D is the social damage and can be seen to be a function of environ-
mental input use and a vector, X of state characteristics. Exogenous factors that are 
included as state characteristics affecting environmental preferences include income 
level, population density, and the amount of polluting industry existing within the 
state. 
The marginal damage of an additional unit of environmental input use within a 
state is obtained by differentiating the damage function with respect to the environ-
mental input. Assuming that the state sets regulatory policy so that compliance cost 
is equal to the marginal damage, then the input cost of utilizing the environment is 
a function of the quantity of environmental input use and the state characteristics. 
( 6) 
).ilore hog inventory can be placed in a state, but a higher regulatory cost must be 
paid for that placement. 
This system is closed by assummg that in equilibrium the derived demand of 
environmental input is equal to the supply of environmental input at the given level 
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of environmental input cost. This allows the following relationship to be obtained for 
the price of the environmental input: 
(7) 
The predicted values from the estimation of this functional relationship can then be 
used in place of the environmental input price in the estimation of supply in equation 
(3) and efficient estimates of the effect of the environmental input price on supply 
can be obtained. The empirical model that is estimated, and the results of those 
estimations, are presented in the next section. 
Empirical Analysis 
An annual panel data set of variables for the years 1984 through 1998 is collected 
representing hog inventory, output price, input prices, and transportation costs for 
the 27 top hog producing states. The states are grouped in five regions to capture 
some of the geographical variance that may exist for characteristics such as climate, 
soil types, and landscape. A listing of the states examined and the regions used is 
presented in Table 1. 
The relationship of profit maximizing supply to the prices and costs as defined 
in Equation (3) will be used to define a supply equation to estimate the importance 
of these costs on hog production location. Two-stage estimation techniques will first 
estimate the endogenous cost of the environmental input, and then the predictions of 
this cost will be used as regressors in the estimation of the supply equation parameters. 
The estimated equation for hog supply is represented as follows: 
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(8) 
where Z 0 is the vector of percentage share of total U.S. hog inventories for the states, 
P 0 is the price of output, P~, P 3 are input prices for feed and land, P4 is the vector 
of predicted values used as an instrument for the endogenous environmental input 
price (discussed below), HWY, SLAUG, GSPFARM are the proxies for cost of 
transportation, J3rR is a matrix of parameters and dummy variables for the regional 
characteristics, J3t T is a matrix of the parameter estimates and dummy variables 
for the effects of time periods, and c is a vector of the overall random disturbance. 
The variable representing labor costs is found to be highly co-linear with other price 
variables in the model and is dropped. Labor costs can be justifiably dropped from 
the analysis as they represent only a small portion of the total costs in hog production. 
Transportation costs could not be obtained directly as firm level location data is 
not available. Instead, the number of rural highway miles, state gross state product 
(GSP) from agriculture, and the percentage of total U.S. hog slaughter in a state 
are used as the proxies of transportation costs. The inclusion of the number of rural 
highway miles captures the availability of roads in rural areas, the percentage of hogs 
slaughtered in the state attempts to capture the level of availability of an output 
market for hog operations within the state, and the inclusion of state GSP derived 
from agriculture is used to capture the benefits that may be available to farms locating 
within the state from existing state infrastructure for agricultural operations. 
Regional and time effects are included in the model as fixed effect dummy vari-
ables. Specification tests found these fixed effects to be highly significant for the 
models using state spending and nutrient measure proxies. The same test did not 
find significant fixed effects for the model using the qualitative proxy, and therefore 
these effects are not included in that model. The summary statistics for all of the 
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variables used in the model are presented in Table 2. 
Stringency Proxies 
The vector P 4 is the predicted values for the cost of environmental inputs obtained 
from the estimation of the relationship derived in Equation (7): 
P 4 roPo + 11P1 + 12P3 + r3HWY + r4SLAUG + 1sGSPFARM + 
r6POPDEN + r7INC + rsGSPALL + rrR +ItT+ v (9) 
where POPDEN is state population density, INC is state per capita income, GSPALL 
is the percentage of gross state product derived from all water pollution intensive in-
dustries, and v is a vector of random disturbances. 
The cost of environmental inputs, p4 , is included through regulatory stringency 
proxies. Obtaining an accurate price for the environment as an input is difficult and, 
therefore, four separate proxies of this cost are utilized and their results are compared. 
The first proxy examined is the amount of state spending on water quality. Spend-
ing on water quality is defined as monies spent by states on managing water quality 
programs and on enforcement of water quality regulations. A higher value of spending 
would be expected to be representative of a state with more regulation and enforce-
ment and therefore a higher compliance cost. This spending value is normalized 
by two different measures in order to create a relative measure of stringency: total 
state expenditure and total water area. The two separate normalizations are used to 
confirm that the results are not dependent on the normalization variable. 
The second measure used is that of the nitrogen levels found in rivers locat-
ed within the high pork-production areas of the states. Rivers are located within 
counties with the highest hog production in each of the states, and these rivers are 
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cross-referenced with the United States Geological Survey water quality inventory 
database to identify nutrient monitoring stations located in these areas. One station 
is identified for each of the states and the ma.ximum annual recorded nitrogen levels at 
these stations are collected. These values should capture some measure of compliance 
costs in the state as higher relative maximum values would suggest a more lenient 
regulatory system and therefore lower environmental compliance costs. 
The third measure used is a qualitative measure constructed through examination 
of the waste management regulations imposed on AFOs. Regulations are examined for 
the years 1994 and 1998 and a listing of the various regulations imposed to protect 
water quality from animal waste is constructed. Each state is then rated; 1=low, 
2=average, or 3=high in terms of the state regulatory environment. These qualitative 
measures and the individual state regulation information can be found in Figures 1 
and 2. 
The estimation above was run four times. The first two models utilize state 
water quality spending normalized by total spending and total water area as the 
index of the environmental input price. The third run uses the maximum nitrogen 
measure and the fourth uses the qualitative stringency measure. Two-stage least 
squares is the estimation technique used to obtain parameters for the two continuous 
endogenous stringency measures; water quality spending and the maximum nitrogen 
measure. Parameter estimates using the qualitative stringency measure are obtained 
through the methodology developed for endogenous qualitative variables developed 
by Heckman (Heckman 1978, Murphy and Topel 1985). 
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Results: Water Quality Spending Measure 
The data collected for water quality spending was available for the years 1986, 1988, 
1991, 1994, and 1996. All of the major hog producing states were examined for these 
years. In order to examine scale effects, the data is disaggregated into small farms, 
under 500 head, and large farms, over 500 head, and estimation of effects is conducted 
on these groups separately. Limited data on inventory by farm size and confidentiality 
of state slaughter data removes some observations, leaving 64 useable observations. 
Water quality spending is normalized by total state expenditures in the first model 
run and by total state water area in the second run. These two normalizations show 
similar results. The model is run in log-log form and parameter estimates are provided 
in Table 3.3 
The effect of water quality spending normalized by total state spending is found 
to be significantly positive for small farms with less than 500 head. This suggests that 
as water quality spending per dollar of total state spending increases, the percentage 
share of hogs produced on small farms increases within the state. The effect for 
large farms is not determined to be significant. The unexpected positive effect of 
regulation on small farm production may be indicating that there is some benefit to 
small hog operations when a state has a more structured regulatory system. This 
is an observation made in other studies using environmental spending as a proxy 
(Tannenwald 1997). It may also be a result of anti-large-farm sentiment within states 
with more spending on water quality. 
Parameter estimates for hog price, corn price, rural highways, percentage slaugh-
ter. and farm GSP are all significant for small farms and all provide the expected 
effects. Results for large farms suggest that existing infrastructure is important as 
parameter estimates for percentage slaughter and farm GSP are positive and signifi-
cant. 
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The second model run is performed on the same data set with water quality spend-
ing normalized by water area instead of total state spending. The results are similar. 
Small farms are found to experience a significant positive effect on the percentage 
share of hog production while large farms do not seem to be affected by increased 
water quality spending. 
Results: Maximum Nitrogen Measure 
The data collected for maximum nitrogen measures includes the years 1984-1994. The 
nutrient measure used is the maximum level of nitrogen recorded during the year in 
a river located within a high hog production area of the state. Again, operations are 
divided into over and under 500 head, and also, again, the available data on inventory 
by farm size is a limiting factor and reduces the analysis to 112 observations. The 
model is run as a log-log specification and the parameter estimates are presented in 
Table 4. 
Results for small farms suggest that environmental stringency as measured by 
the nutrient proxy is significant, and less stringency leads to an increase in produc-
tion. 4 This is the only evidence in this study that suggests increased environmental 
stringency has a negative effect on production. Results for regulatory stringency on 
production for large farms are again insignificant. 
Input costs for land as well a...c; transportation costs and infrastructure are found 
to be significant factors in determining production on small farms. Large farms are, 
again, found to be most influenced by existing agricultural operations and infrastruc-
ture. 
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Results: Qualitative Measure 
The years examined in the qualitative stringency model include 1991-1998. The 
qualitative stringency measures are created for regulations in the years 1994 and 
1998 and in order to increase the number of observations examined, the years 1991-
1994 are examined using 1994 stringency and the years 1995-1998 are examined using 
1998 stringency. This is reasonable because hog operations are forward looking and 
therefore should be following expected future trends in regulation. In order to examine 
scale effects, farms are separated into under and over 1,000 head, which provides 128 
observations for this analysis. This model is not logged and the results are provided 
in Table 5. 
Water quality regulation as proxied by the stringency measure does not have a 
significant effect on either small or large farms. Small farms are influenced by output 
and input prices as well as transportation costs and availability of slaughter capacity. 
Large farms are also influenced by the availability of slaughter capacity. 
Conclusions 
The effect of increased water quality regulation on the concentration of hog produc-
tion is an important environmental policy question. A profit maximization for hog 
producers is developed to examine this issue and four stringency proxies are included 
in the model to represent environmental compliance costs. One of the proxies is a 
qualitative measure developed exclusively for this study through examination of state 
legislation regulating AFO waste management. The inherent endogeneity of state hog 
inventory and the level of state regulation is accounted for in the analysis. 
Overall results for the water quality spending proxy would seem to suggest that 
production on smaller farms is influenced by increased regulatory stringency but the 
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effect is, unexpectedly, positive. This result may be capturing benefits to small farms 
from increased spending that are not related to increased compliance costs. Large 
farms do not seem to be affected by increased regulatory stringency as measured by 
water quality spending. Results for the maximum nitrogen proxy suggest small farms 
are influenced by input costs and water quality stringency. States that seem to have 
lower stringency also seem to have higher production levels on small farms within the 
state. This is the only evidence of a negative effect on production and, given the other 
results in the paper, this evidence is not substantial. Large farms are influenced by 
agricultural infrastructure and not by the maximum nitrogen water quality regulatory 
stringency proxy. The qualitative stringency measures are not significant for either 
large or small farms. 
In general, the traditional input and output prices as well as transportation costs 
seem to influence production on smaller farms. Production on larger farms seems to 
respond to existing agricultural infrastructure but not to the input or output prices. 
It is obvious that input and output prices must play some role in the location of large 
farms, but it may be that these newer larger farms are responding more to factors 
other than the traditional input cost considerations. For example, these operations 
may be locating to minimize distances to export points and gain an advantage in 
the newly expanding pork export market. This type of new location consideration 
may explain movement of the industry to the west and therefore closer to the points 
exporting to the large Asian market. 
Throughout the course of my research on this topic, a large set of specifications 
(functional forms, variable transformation, and four proxies of stringency) have been 
examined and the econometric evidence consistently fails to establish a link between 
the stringency of state water quality regulation and the location of hog production. 
Therefore, it seems that, from a policy perspective, the current trend of increasing 
17 
environmental regulation does not have a significant impact on the location of hog 
production. 
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Endnotes 
1 The variable t 4 is the per-unit transportation cost for the environmental input. 
This value may be thought of as the transportation costs for moving hog wastes 
from storage to fields and will be captured in the regulatory stringency measure. 
More stringent regulation increases these transportation costs through more strict 
regulation on where and when manure may be applied to fields. 
2 It is assumed that environmental input use in hog production is a significant en-
vironmental concern in the state. Since we are examining water quality regulation 
specifically in the major hog producing states, this assumption seems appropriate. 
3 Parameter estimates of dummy variables while important to capture unexplained 
variation are not crucial to the model interpretation and therefore are not presented 
in the interest of simplifying the presentation of the results. 
4 Remember, increases in the maximum nitrogen measure indicate decreases in regu-
latory stringency. 
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Table 1 
Twenty Seven Major Hog Production States 
I Region State 
.0l'ortheast Maryland, New York, Pennsylvania 
iv1idwest Michigan, Minnesota, Wisconsin, 
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Missouri, Ohio 
Southern Kentucky, North Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia 
Georgia, South Carolina, Arkansas, Mississippi 
Central Oklahoma, Texas, Kansas, Nebraska, 
South Dakota 
Western Arizona, Colorado, Oregon 
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Table 2 i 
SUMMARY STATISTICS j 1984-1994 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation 
Percentage Share of 0.027 
Total US Inventory 
0.03 I 
Price of Hogs 48.96 5.12 
($ per c-wt) 
Price of Corn 2.59 0.53 ' ' 
($ per bushel) I 
Land Value 777.04 388.91 
($ per acre) 
Expenditure on Water 0.003 0.003 
Quality ($ per total exp.) 
Maximum Nitrogen 0.007 0.013 
(mg/L)/(inv) 
Rural Roads 0.0013 0.00039 
(miles per square mile) 
Population Density 0.099 0.08 
I (persons per sq. mi.) 
Percentage of 0.023 0.025 
US Slaughter 
Median Income 26,426 4,738 
( $) 
Percentage GSP from 0.028 0.027 
Agriculture 
Percentage GSP from 0.079 0.038 I 
Water Pollution Industries I 
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variable 
Hog Price 
Corn Price 
Land Value 
Highway 
Slaughter 
Farm GSP 
WQ Spending 
variable 
Hog Price 
Corn Price 
Land Value 
Highway 
Slaughter 
Farm GSP 
WQ Spending 
Table 3 
Structural Equation Results 
\Vater Quality Spending 
Normalized by Total Spending 
N=64 
Small Farms Large Farms 
R 2 = .89 R2 = .87 
parameter t-ratio parameter t-ratio 
10.92 3.4*** -0.34 -0.1 
-4.62 -4.08*** 3.57 3.07*** 
0.38 1.38 1.19 4.19*** 
1.73 3.44*** -0.32 -0.64 
0.21 2.9*** 0.4 5.42*** 
0.26 2.25** 0.64 5.5*** 
0.35 2.34** 0.11 0.73 
Normalized by Water Area 
N=64 
Small Farms Large Farms 
R2 = .89 R2 = .87 
parameter t-ratio parameter t-ratio 
10.24 3.38*** -1.68 -0.53 
-4.35 -4.18*** 4.14 3.8*** 
-0.11 -0.32 1.33 3.53*** 
1.00 2.4** -0.52 -1.19 
0.21 3.01 *** 0.41 5.54*** 
0.33 3.07*** 0.67 5.88*** 
0.28 2.6*** -0.035 -0.31 
I * s1gmficant at 10% ** s1gmficant at 5% *** s1gmficant at 1% 
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Table 4 
Structural Equation Results 
Maximum Nitrogen Measure 
N=112 
Small Farms Large Farms 
R2 = .92 R2 = .87 
variable parameter t-ratio parameter t-ratio 
Hog Price -0.55 -0.47 -2.19 -1.38 
Corn Price -0.97 -1.38 2.56 2.69*** 
Land Value -0.82 -4.03*** 1.58 5.71 *** 
Highway 0.61 2 -** .0 0.29 0.88 
Slaughter -0.08 -0.71 0.69 4.51 *** 
Farm GSP 0.51 6.79*** 0.93 9.17*** 
MaxN 1.79 4.9*** -0.73 -1.47 
I * significant at 10% ** significant at 5% *** significant at 1% I 
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Table 5 
Structural Equation Results 
Qualitative Stringency Measure 
N=128 
Small Farms 
I 
Large Farms 
R2 = .90 R 2 = .65 
variable parameter t-ratio parameter t-ratio 
Hog Price .00047 1.86* 0.00024 0.57 
Corn Price -0.0096 -2.26** 0.0079 1.12 
Land Value -0.000015 -3.6*** 0.0000074 1.03 
Highway 30.65 4.72*** -7.88 -0.73 
Slaughter 0.86 26.32*** 0.7 12.9*** 
Farm GSP -0.15 -1.49 -0.27 -1.55 
Stringency Index -0.0031 -1.14 -0.0014 -0.31 
* s1gmficant at 10% ** s1gmficant at 5% *** s1gmficant at 1% 
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I 
I 
0 :1 J i 1 ~· 
Arkansas 0 0 
Georgia 1 1 
Illinois 0 1 
Indiana 0 1 
Iowa 0 1 
Kansas 0 1 
Kentucky 0 1 
Michigan 0 0 
Minnesota 1 1 
Mississipj.li 0 1 
Missouri 0 1 
Nebraska 0 1 
New York 0 0 
North Carolina 0 0 
Ohio 0 0 
Oklahoma 0 1 
Pennsylvania 0 0 
South Dakota 0 0 
Texas 0 1 
Virgina 0 1 
Wisconsin 0 0 
o~none 1 =exists 2=extensive 
Source: Copeland, 1994 
~ $ 
I I i 
i ~ 
"' ~ .. f 
1 1 
1 0 
0 0 
1 1 
1 1 
1 0 
1 0 
0 0 
2 1 
1 0 
1 1 
1 0 
0 0 
1 0 
2 1 
1 0 
1 0 
0 1 
1 0 
1 0 
1 0 
State AFO Regulations 1994 
1 ! ~ g J E I J I '1 1 s ~ "' j I § 1 g g 'I § I I ¢ t 5 "' ~ j '8 '! J l i ~· .J 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 0 0 1 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 1 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
0 1 0 1 1 0 0 
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 1 1 1 1 0 0 
1 0 0 1 1 0 1 
0 0 1 1 0 0 1 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 1 1 0 1 
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
l I J I 1 l If J J 
1 1 1 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 1 1 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 1 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 1 1 0 
0 1 1 0 
1 1 1 0 
2 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 
0 1 1 0 
2 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
'! 
.. 
,. 
~ 
l 
J 
0 0 
0 1 
1 1 
0 1 
1 1 
0 0 
1 0 
0 1 
0 1 
1 1 
1 1 
1 0 
1 1 
0 1 
1 1 
1 1 
1 1 
0 0 
1 1 
0 1 
0 1 
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0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
~ 
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I 
3 
3 
1 
2 
2 
2 
1 
1 
3 
2 
3 
1 
2 
1 
3 
3 
2 
1 
3 
2 
1 
0 
;:l 
rJJ 
I 
8 ~ §. J £: c: s 1 l ~ # g 
....J Q J 
Arizona 1 0 
Arkansas 0 1 
Colorado 1 0 
Georg_ia 1 1 
Illinois 0 1 
Indiana 1 0 
Iowa 0 1 
Kansas 0 1 
Kentucky 0 0 
Maryland 1 1 
Michigan 1 0 
Minnesota 1 0 
Mississippi 1 1 
Missouri 0 1 
Nebraska 1 1 
New York 1 0 
North Carolina 1 1 
Ohio 0 1 
Oklahoma 0 1 
Oregon 0 0 
Pennsylvania 1 0 
South Carolina 0 1 
South Dakota 1 1 
Tennessee 0 1 
Virgina 1 1 
O=none 1 =exists 2=extensive 
Source: NACPTF, 1998 
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1 
0 
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1 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
State AFO Regulations 1998 
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0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 2 3 
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 
2 1 1 1 1 0 2 1 0 0 0 3 
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 2 
1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
2 1 2 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 3 
2 2 1 1 2 1 1 0 1 0 0 3 
1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 2 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 3 
1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 2 
0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 3 
1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 2 
1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 2 
1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 2 
2 1 2 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 3 
1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 3 
1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 
0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 2 
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